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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
In this criminal case, the Court of Appeals has authority to
decide the appeal based upon Utah Code Annotated, 78-2(a)-2(e),
which grants to the Court of Appeal appellate jurisdiction in final
orders involving criminal cases

Rule 3 and 4 of the Rules of the

Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On the 3rd day of January, 1990, and later on May 10, 1990,
Judge Douglas Cornaby, Second District Court, entered an order
denying the motion to set aside the prior judgment. This is an
Appeal in a criminal case after a plea of guilty to charge of a
Third Degree Felony Aggravated Assault Utah Code Annotated (76-5103) .

After the plea was entered and after sentencing, the

Defendant made a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, an evidentiary
hearing

was held on September 12, 1989, at which time the Court

denied the motion. After the first appeal in this matter was
dismissed due to a lack of a signed order, the Court signed an
Order on May 10, 1990, denying the Motion to set aside the plea.
This appeal concerning the denial of that motion was timely filed.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the court err in accepting

aside the guilty plea

of the Defendant in light of the evidence that the offense was a
1

Simple Assault and the fact that he was not represented by an
effective legal counsel at the time of plea.
2.

In light of claim of the Defendant as to the lack of

serious bodily injury, a firearm, and lack of intent to cause
serious injury, did the defendant-respondent show good cause to
withdraw his plea.
3.

Did

the

Court

err

in

applying

the

wrong

standard

concerning the motion to withdraw the plea.
4.

The standard of review is specifically set forth in Point

II of the brief.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated
76-5-102. Assault
(1)

(2)

Assault is:
(a)

an attempt with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another;

(b)

a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or

(c)

an act, committed with unlawful force or violence,
that causes bodily injury to another.

Assault is a class B misdemeanor.

Utah Code Annotated
76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1)

A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault
as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a)

intentionally
another; or

causes

(b)

uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1601 or other means or force likely to produce death

2

serious

bodily

injury

to

or serious injury•
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony.
Rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Subsection 5: (prior to 1989 Amendment):
77-35-11. Rule 11 - Pleas. (a) Upon arraignment, except in
case of an infraction a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives
counsel in open court, and shall not be required to
plead until he has had a reasonable time to confer
with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or no
contest. If a defendant refuses to pleas or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court
shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the
consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty,
the case shall forthwith be set for trail.
Defendants unable to make bail shall be given a
preference for an early trial. In non-felony cases
the court shall advise the defendant, or his
counsel, of the requirements for making a written
demand *for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty
or no contest and shall not accept such a plea until
the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by
counsel he has knowingly waived his right to counsel
and does not desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he had rights against
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and
to confront and cross-examine in open court the
witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea
he waives all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which he is entering the
plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have
the burden of proving each of those elements beyond
a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an
3

admission of all those elements;
(5)
That the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for
each offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of prior
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, what
agreement has been reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other
party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance
of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal
of other charges, the same shall be approved by the
court. If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by
the court, the court shall advise the defendant
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.
(f)

The judge shall not participate in plea discussions
prior to any agreement being made by the prosecuting
attorney, but once a tentative plea agreement has
been reached which contemplates entry of a plea in
the expectation that other charges will be dropped
or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such
tentative agreement and the reasons therefor in
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The
judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney
and defense counsel whether he will approve the
proposed disposition.
Thereafter, if the judge
decides that final disposition should not be handled
in conformity with the plea agreement, he shall so
advise the defendant and then call upon the
defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal in a criminal case from a sentence entered
after a guilty plea. A motion to set aside was filed after thirty
days from the date of the sentence.

A hearing was held on the

motion to set aside and denied. The Court did not enter a written
findings until May 6, 1990, at which time the Defendant filed an
4

appeal within thirty days.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The appeal was filed from the final order after the first
timely appeal was dismissed due to a lack of a final order.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The Defendant was sentenced to prison for 0 to 5 years for
aggravated assault after a guilty plea.

RELEVANT FACTS
WITH THE CITATIONS TO THE RECORD

1.

After waving his preliminary hearing and pleading not

guilty on the initial arraignment the Defendant was present in
Court on August 30, 1988, for a Pre-trial hearing. (See Transcript
of August 30, 1988).
2.

At the hearing, the Defendant's Counsel indicated the

Defendant would plead guilty as charged to aggravated assault as
the result of a plea agreement.

The only concern under the plea

agreement was that the Prosecutor was to recommend that he would
not spend anymore than thirty (30) days in jail (P. 7 of Transcript
of August 30, 1988).
3.

After discussing with the Defendant the rights he was

waiving, the following exchange took place between the Court, the
Defendant, and Caravel Harward, the prosecutor:
5

MR. HARWARD: Here's what were claiming, the victim
in the case is Ms. McKinnon who is a girlfriend of Mr.
Martinez. He hit her with his hands an feet. He caused
injury to her including a broken nose and damage to her.
She was taken to the Saint Benedict's Hospital in Weber
County where she was treated.
THE COURT: All right. First, an assault— an assault
is an unlawful use of force on a person of another, and you
understand you have no right to exercise any force over
another person, don't you?
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: And that what you did on this occasion you did
wilfully, you wilfully assaulted her.
MR. MARTINEZ: No, I didn't, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, Counsel —
MR. ODA: He's saying wilfully. Do you understand what
willfully means? Willfully as opposed to an accident.
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes.
THE COURT: An illustration is your drive down the road
and somebody runs out between two cars and you wind up
hitting them. That's an accident. You understand this
is wilfully done. This is not an accident. Do you
understand what you're saying?
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes. I understand.
THE COURT:

It was wilfully done; is that correct?

MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You did it intentionally?
MR. MARTINEZ: No
THE COURT: Well, did you intend to hit her?
MR MARTINEZ: No, I didn't.
THE COURT: How did you hit her in the nose and break her
nose without intending to do it?
MR. ODA: I think the problem here, he didn't— we've
talked about this, Your Honor. He didn't intended to
damage her, but he- I think there's no doubt he intended
to 6

THE COURT: Well, the question is when he smacked her in
the nose, did he intend his fist to come in contact with
her nose? That's the intent.
THE COURT: You didn't intend to hit her in the nose?
When your feet came in contact with her, you didn't
intend for your feet to come in contact with her?
MR, MARTINEZ: (Nods head from side to side.)
MR ODA: Do you want to talk about this?
MR. MARTINEZ:

Yes, I understand what he's saying.

THE COURT: You cannot accidentally commit an aggravated
assault. Do you understand that?
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes.
THE COURT:
There's no such thing as an accidental
aggravated
assault.
It must
be
wilfully
and
intentionally done, and the Court can't take a plea
unless it's being plead to wilfully and intentionally
doing it.
MR. MARTINEZ: I didn't intend to hurt her, Your Honor.
MR. ODA:
Did you intend to hit her?
question. Okay. It's very simple, Henry.

That's

the

MR. MARTINEZ: Yes. In intended to hit her, but not
intentionally hurt her, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Did you intentionally kick her?

MR. MARTINEZ: No, I didn't. She struck me first and I
didn't realize that I was a lot stronger than her and I
hurt her, and I'm very sorry for what I've done, but THE COURT: How big is she?
MR. MARTINEZ:
(Indicating).
THE COURT:

She comes to about right here on me.

How much does she weigh?

MR. MARTINEZ: About —
She's about —

I don't know.

THE COURT: More of less than you?
7

I have no ideas.

MR. ODA: I think she weighs about 115, 20 pounds. She's
an average-sized girl.
THE COURT:

And how much do you weigh?

MR.. MARTINEZ: I weigh 130.
THE COURT:

Are you in good physical condition?

MR. MARTINEZ: No I'm not.
THE COURT:

You look like it.

What's the matter with

you?
MR. MARTINEZ: I'm underweight. I don't —
THE COURT: Is there anything the matter with you besides
you're underweight?
MR. MARTINEZ: No. No.
THE COURT:

What do you think you should weigh?

MR. MARTINEZ:
THE COURT:

I should weigh 148 for my size.

And you weigh a hundred and what?

MR. MARTINEZ: I weigh 11. I weighed 115 then when it
happened. I was under a lot of stress and I w a s — I
wasn't eating. When I went to jail, I came out 130.
MR. ODA:
Honor?

Do you want me to talk to the defendant Your

THE COURT:
I think you better. I think you better
because aggravated assault — let me read it.
"That cit the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did
assault another person and intentionally caused serious
bodily injury or did use such means or force likely to
produce serious bodily injury."
Without him pleading to those elements, we've got
to go to trial.
MR. ODA: Okay.
THE COURT: Go in the other room and talk to counsel.
Now, on our next matter, counsel is not here yet. It's set
for 11:00. So we'll be in recess until 11:00.
MR. MAJOR: Thank you, your Honor.
(WHEREUPON, at the time there was a recess after which
8

proceedings resumed as follows:)
THE COURT: The records can show we're back on the State
of Utah vs. Henry A. Martinez.
MR. HARWARD: Your Honor, I have a motion to make to the
Court. In drawing up the information, I have plead in
the alternative. Under the Statute involved a person can
commit aggravated assault by committing simple assault
as that is defined and intentionally causing serious
bodily injury to another or using such means or force
likely to cause injury.
So
for the purpose of this case, I'm going to make a
motion that we delete the language in the information
following the phrase "the defendant did assault another
person and". Okay, Now, delete "intentionally caused
serious bodily injury," and the comma, and the
conjunction or.
So it will read: That at the time and place aforesaid,
the defendant did assault another person and did use such
means or force to produce serious bodily injury.
It's still a felony of the third degree. It only
eliminates the one alternative.
THE COURT: Okay.

Is that agreeable to counsel?

MR. ODA: Yes, Your Honor. I think we all understand the
problem now.
THE COURT: Now, I'm not going to repeat anything I said
before. You understand that?
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, sir.
THE COURT:
We're taking about the elements of the
offense. We have talked about what an assault is, and
he's agreed that he committed an assault. He's agreed
he committed it. So we're down to willful and intentional
part of the committing of the assault, and the remainder
left in here" did use such means or force likely to
produce serious boldly injury."
Do you want to ask your client about that?
MR. ODA: You understand what — we had a discussion out
of the — off the record —
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes.
MR. ODA: — and you understand that now the COurt is
asking you did you do something, that is, strike Teresa
or kick her or do anything that was likely to cause her
seriously bodily injury. Do you understand that?
9

MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, I do.
MR. ODA: As opposed to an accident. Okay. Now, did you
do something that was likely to cause serious bodily
injury to Teresa McKinnon?
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, Your Honor.
for not understanding.
THE COURT:
that.

I apologize.

I'm sorry

No problem, you don't have to apologize for

MR ODA: You understand that what you did was not an
accident, right?
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes.
MR. ODA: Okay. I think he understands better.
problem was that he thought the Court was asking him if
he intentionally intended to break her nose. He was
having a little difficulty with that.

the

THE COURT: I think that we covered all the elements.
Did we leave any out, counsel, that you know of?
MR. HARWARD:
elements.

No, I think we've covered all of the

THE COURT: All right. Having asked you all of these
question, have you changed your minds about wanting to
enter into the negotiated plea?
MR. MARTINEZ: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Did you say no?

MR. MARTINEZ: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right. the Court will find you
appear to be making a voluntary, knowing and understating
pleas. As to the charge of aggravated assault, a felony
of the third degree, do you want it entered as a pleas
of guilty or not guilty?
MR. MARTINEZ: Guilty, Your Honor.
(Page 9 line 2 to Page 16 line 3)
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4.

The matter came back before the Judge for sentencing on

September 27, 1988, at that time the Court sentenced the Defendant
to undergo a ninety-day diagnostic evaluation until December 20,
1988. At that time on exchange took place between the Defendant's
attorney and the Court concerning the presentence report.

The

Defendant's counsel indicated that the Defendant during the ninety
day evaluation process did not recognize that he did something
wrong. The Defendant's Counsel made no attempt to correct or amend
the report.

On December 20, 1988, the Defendant appeared for

sentencing and his sentencing was continued because of problems
concerning the presentence report. Defendant's Counsel stated that
he needed additional time to obtained more information.
5.

On January 3, 1989, the Defendant appeared at Court and

the Court stated:
I noted that we continued this a couple weeks
because you wanted to get more information for the
Court Did you get that?
MR. ODA: Yes, Your Honor, Well, the order was to
obtain another information for the Department of
Corrections as to Mr. Martinez's attitude and
history, but we're unable to get that done, so we're
prepared to get sentence at this particular time.
(Page 3 line 13 to Page 3 line 20)
6.

The Court then sentenced the Defendant to immediately

zero to 5 years in the State Prison.

After being committed to

Prison, the Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside.
7.

On Tuesday, September 12, 1989, a hearing was held on the

Defendants Motions to set aside the plea of guilty filed after
sentencing.
Q

Mr. Martinez took the stand and testified as follows:
And did you have occasion to talk to Mr. Oda
11

prior to Judge Cornaby asking you some questions about
your guilty plea?
A
Umm, I was called in to the Counsel room for
about five minutes before I went on the stand.
Q.
Did he give you some advice in relation
as to what to say when Judge Cornaby asked you
the questions?
A.
Yes, he did. He told me to shut my mouth
so I wouldn't piss off the judge anymore of
piss him off at that present time.
(Page 6 of September 12, 1989 hearing.)
Concerning the voluntarily of his plea, Mr. Martinez stated:
Q.
Did you willingly and voluntarily enter
a guilty plea?
A. No, I can't say that. I feel I was coerced
into it.
Q.
Were there any promises made to you by anybody
concerning your guilty by either Mr. O d a —
A.
Yes
Q.
What was that?
A.
Leniency of conviction, that I was — well
lemiency of the outcome. That's what I mean
to say.
Q. Did that influence you to say not guilty?
A. Yes, it did.
(Page 7 line 10 to Page line 24)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT
I
ISSUES
NO FACTUAL BASIS EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE
PLEA IN LIGHT OF THE INADEQUATE EXAMINATION OF
THE DEFENDANT AT THE TIME THE PLEA WAS ENTERED
AND THE FAILURE TO ENTER SUFFICIENT FINDINGS
AFTER THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE MOTION TO
SET ASIDE THE PLEA.
In Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), the
Supreme Court described the applicable legal standards to be
applied in cases involving motions to withdraw a guilty plea. The
12

Court stated:
Section 77-35-l(e)(4) of the Code requires
that before a trial court accepts a guilty
plea, it must find that the defendant
understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which he or she is entering the
pleas. In Gibbons, this Court stated that in
making this finding, the trial court must
ensure that the defendant understands "the
elements of the crimes charged and the
relationship of the law to the facts." Id. at
1312.
In addition, section 77-35-ll(e)(5)
requires that before the trial court accepts
a guilty plea, it must find that the defendant
knows of the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences.
The record clearly
shows that at the time the guilty pleas were
accepted, Judge Burns did not make the
findings required by the Code, i.e., that
Jolivet understood the elements of each crime
charged and how those elements related to the
facts and that Jolivet knew the possibility of
the imposition of consecutive sentences.
However, this Court has held, "[T]he absence
of a finding under [section 77-335-11] is not
critical so long as the record as a whole
affirmatively establishes that the defendant
entered his plea with full knowledge and
understanding of its consequences and of the
rights he was waiving." (at 18)
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court
because the lower court had made specific findings that the plea
was knowingly and voluntarily entered and that "[in] particular,
Judge Burns found that Jolivet understood the elements of the
crimes charged and how those elements related to the facts..."(at
18) .
In Mr. Martinez's case, the trial judge made no such findings,
either before the plea or after the hearing.

At the time of the

hearing on the motion to set aside, the trial judge had access to

13

a transcript of the plea and should have been aware of the
Defendant's prior ambiguous answers.
page

29,

line

12)

However,

the

(See transcript of 9-12-89,
court

did

not

make

any

particularized findings which correlate the Defendants statements
at the time of the plea to the specific elements of aggravated
assault. Furthermore, the court never signed any written findings
which relate* to the requirements concerning the factual basis for
the plea and only made a general finding that the plea was
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered.
The necessity of findings of fact, including the Defendant's
understanding of elements of the charges and the relationship of
the law and facts was set forth in State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

The State v. Valencia, the court stated:

The trial court is emburdened to ensure compliance
with the constitutional and Rule 11(5) requirements when
a guilty plea is received. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312.
Although the issue here was first raised on appeal by
appellcint, in certain cases we may consider the failure
to comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons as error
sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be first raised
on appeal to this court. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 241-42, 89 S.Ct. 1709. 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)
("It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the
trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without
an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and
voluntary.") .
We consider the trial court's examination of defendant
at the time of the plea to be wholly inadequate under
Rule 11(5). See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13. Strict,
and not just substantial, compliance with the rule is
required. State v.. Vasilacopulos, 756 P. 2d 92, 94 (Utah
App.1988).
The defendant demonstrated consistently that the original plea
was not knowingly or intelligently entered.
14

The trial judge in

this case relied on the affidavit signed at the time of the entry
of the plea and the defendant's confused responses.

In State v.

Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1988):
The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote
efficiency, but an affidavit should be only the
starting point, not an end point, in the pleading
process.... The trial judge should then review the
statements in the affidavit with the defendant,
question the defendant concerning his understanding
of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed
by Section 77-35-11 on the record before accepting
the guilty plea.
There is no sufficient examination, on the record, to provide
a factual basis to conclude the Defendant knew the elements of the
felony offense.
1989).

The

See State v. Vasilacopolous, 756 P.2d 94 (Utah
defendant

merely

indicated

that

he

did

not

"negligently" injure the alleged victim and always protested any
intent to cause serious injury.
Finally, the court did not enter any findings of conduct any
inquiry concerning the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
raised by the Defendant at the post-plea hearing.

The Utah cases

require an adequate record in order to determine whether the
Defendant received effective assistance of counsel and entered a
plea with full rights to counsel. Jensen v. Deland. 125 Utah Adv.
Rep. 19 (1990), Bundv v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988) and
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
The defendant testified that he was not effectively assisted
by counsel at the post-trial hearing (See transcript sept. 12,
1989, page 8 to 11).

The court took a recess to allow the

15

Defendant to consult with his attorney at the time of the original
plea; however, the unrebutted testimony at the post-trial hearing
proves he was not effectively represented .

In any event, the

prosecutor had to on the spot amend the Information to provide that
"the defendant did assault another person and did use such means
or force likely to produce serious bodily injury."

(Page 13, line

25) .
The Defendant submits that the record is devoid after the
amendment of any discussion concerning the actual elements of
aggravated assault, especially the element of intent.

The only

discussion is concerning the difference between simple negligence
or accident and there is no examination as to the intent required
by the offense. See State in the Interest of Besendorfer, 568 P.d
742 (1973), State v. McElhanev, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978), and State
v. Elliott, 641 P.2d 122 (Utah 1982).

II.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER RULE 11 OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS TO
DETERMINE IF THERE HAS BEEN STRICT COMPLIANCE
WITH THE RULE.
In State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1989) the Court
of Appeals stated that "strict and not just substantial compliance
is required under Rule 11."

The court held that the facts to

determine whether the Defendant understood the elements of the
charges and the relationship of the law and facts may not be
presumed from a silent or incomplete examination. The court stated
16

that the failure to make adequate findings constitutes reversible
error. See also. State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep 56 (Ct. App.
1990.(Sufficient examination must be on the record or reversal)
III.
THE OBJECTIVE, UNREBUTTED RECORD DEMONSTRATES
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The defendant-appellant submits that the record demonstrates
that he was not represented by effective defense counsel at the
time the plea was entered, a critical stage of the proceedings.
The prosecution

never

called

at the post-trial

hearing

any

witnesses and tried to impeach the defendant by the plea statement
form.

The defendants testimony that he was coerced and not

represented by effective counsel when the plea was entered stands
unrebutted.
This testimony is corroborated by the record which shows a
defendant that is confused about the offense prior to the recess.
At that time

the appellant has testified that he

was pressured

into entering the plea.(see page 12 of this brief an Page 6 to 11
of 9-12-90 transcript)
Both the defendant's confusion over the elements and the
alleged lack of effective counsel is evidenced by the December 20,
1988, hearing, (see page 11 of this brief and transcript of 1-31988) At that time, the defense counsel reports that the defendant
has

an

"attitude"

problem

because

of

responsibility for the alleged offense.
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failure

to

accept

Defense counsel also

requests more time to obtain additional information.

At the

January 3, 1989, hearing counsel admits that the information was
not obtained.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The Defendant-Appellant submits that the initial examination
of the Defendant did not comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

Thereafter, the Defendant-Appellant filed a

timely motion to set aside and introduced uncontroverted evidence
that the plea was not voluntary or knowing and that he was not
effectively represented at the time of the plea.
Therefore, the court should reverse the order denying the
motion to set aside and enter an order directing the lower court
to set aside the plea of guilty and to proceed to a new trial on
the original charges.
Respectfully submitted this

day of September, 1990.

RANDALL GAITHER
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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APPENDUM
The applicable statutes and relevant portions of the record
have been reproduced in the brief.
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